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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROSE 0. SWEDIN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
THORSTEN FRED SWEDIN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 16003 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Order to Show Cause in Re Contempt by plaintiff for 
delinquent support payments and to enforce provisions of the 
Decree of Divorce, requiring the defendant to pay all mutual 
joint family obligations; and for modification of Decree of 
Divorce to require the defendant to maintain medical insurance 
for the minor children and to continue support payments for 
post-high school education. (R. 48-53) 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Court denied plaintiff's request for modification 
of the Decree of Divorce; ordered future support payments to be 
paid through the Clerk of the Court; denied defendant's motion 
for referral to Judge Winder; and held defendant liable for all 
debts and obligations of the marriage under the Decree of Divorce 
up to April 19, 1976, as a matter of law. (R. 60, 78, 84-93) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Affirmance of the judgment and order of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For the purpose of clarification and convenience, the 
parties will be referred to as plaintiff and defendant as they 
appeared in the original divorce proceedings. 
Plaintiff was awarded a Decree of Divorce from defendant 
on April 19, 1976, which Decree provided, among other things, 
that the defendant was "to assume and pay any and all mutual 
joint family financial obligations and debts incurred by 
plaintiff and defendant during their marriage, keeping the 
plaintiff harmless from any and all such creditors, excepting *** 
future house payments on the realty awarded to plaintiff". 
15) 
(R. 14-
Subsequent to the Decree of Divorce, on or about August 2, 
1976, the plaintiff filed an Affidavit for Order to Show Cause, 
seeking to modify the Decree of Divorce in certain particulars, 
one of which was to require the defendant to assume and pay the 
mortgage obligation owing to defendant's mother on the real 
property awarded to plaintiff, which mortgage obligation plaintiff 
was ordered to assume and pay by the Decree of Divorce as stated 
above. (R. 16-17) At the time of hearing on plaintiff's Affidavit, 
she withdrew her request to modify the Decree of Divorce. (R. 36, 
38; T. 145) Judge Winder dismissed this request with prejudice. 
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Thereafter, on February 16, 1978, plaintiff served 
defendant with an Order to Show Cause in Re Contempt in 
connection with her Verified Petition for non-payment of 
support and for modification of Decree of Divorce. (R. 48-53) 
Hearing was held on March 9, 1978, before the Honorable G. Hal 
Taylor. (R. 60) On March 6, 1978, just prior to hearing, 
defendant, through his attorney, filed a Motion for Referral 
to Judge David K. Winder (R. 55), which Motion the Court 
properly denied. (R.78) The lower court concluded as a 
matter of law that the defendant, under the Decree of Divorce, 
was obligated to pay any and all mutual and joint family financial 
obligations and debts incurred by the parties during their 
marriage, including payments on the real property awarded to 
plaintiff up to April 19, 1976; That plaintiff was obligated to 
pay all future mortgage or contract payments on the horne 
awarded to her after April 19, 1976; and that there was 
insufficient evidence before the Court at that time to 
determine the amount which was delinquent and owing on the horne 
awarded to plaintiff in the Decree of Divorce, which defendant 
should be responsible to pay; That such amount was to be 
determined in a subsequent action or hearing based upon the 
demand that had been made upon plaintiff by the mortgage holder 
for delinquent payments on the said real property. The Court 
further concluded that plaintiff would be entitled to a judgment 
against defendant for all delinquent mortgage or contract payments 
-3-
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that should have been paid on the mortgage or contract of 
purchase on the real property awarded to plaintiff up to 
and including April 19, 1976. 
The Court also concluded as a matter of law that the 
prior Order entered by Judge Winder pursuant to the hearing 
on February 11, 1977, was not a determination of the issue of 
the delinquency of the mortgage payments or contract payments 
on the mortgage or contract on the real property and home 
awarded to plaintiff herein. 
From the above rulings and conclusions arrived at by the 
lower court, defendant has appealed. 
ARGUME~T 
POINT I 
DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR REFERRAL WAS 
PROPER AND IS SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND CIRCU!1STANCES 
OF THE CASE. 
Defendant erroneously asserts that the claim of plaintiff 
to enforce the Decree of Divorce as set forth in her Verified 
Petition filed February 21, 1978 (R. 48-51), is identical to 
the request of plaintiff for modification of the Decree of 
Divorce which came before Judge Winder on February 11, 1977. 
A reading of the Order on Order to Show Cause prepared by 
defendant (R. 38), and the transcript of the proceedings 
before Judge Winder (T. 145), clearly establish that plaintiff 
sought a modification of the Decree of Divorce which required 
-4-
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plaintiff to pay "future house payments on the realty awarded 
to the plaintiff." (R. 14-15) Defendant without question under-
stood the proceedings of February 11, 1977, to be a Petition 
for Modification of the Decree. The wording of defendant used 
in the Order on Order to Show Cause confirms this, to-wit: 
"Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause requesting 
that the Court enter judgment against the defendant 
for an arrearage in chils (sic.) support payments 
and find him in contempt for violation of the 
Decree heretofore entered, for the modification of 
the Decree to require the defendant to pay the 
monthly installments on the real property contract 
in connection with the real property awarded to 
plaintiff ***" (Emphasis Added) 
The transcript of the hearing before Judge Winder on 
February 11, 1977, also confirms that the parties regarded 
plaintiff's petition to be that for modification, to-wit: 
MR. ALLRED: Before we get into that, may I at least 
inquire. I think there are three things in the 
Petition. One is a modification of the Decree to 
require payment on an obligation on which plaintiff 
now owes, **** (Emphasis added) (T. 145) 
The Petition of plaintiff filed on February 21, 1978, 
heard before Judge Taylor on March 9, 1978, was brought to 
enforce the obligation and Order of the Court contained in 
paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce, which reads as follows: 
5. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay any 
and all mutual and joint family financial obligations 
and debts incurred by the plaintiff and defendant during 
their marriage, keeping the plaintiff harmless from any 
-5-
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and all such creditors, excepting the following 
obligations which the plaintiff is ordered to 
assume and pay, to-wit: future house payments 
on the realty awarded to plaintiff." (R. 14-15) 
The Verified Petition of plaintiff clearly sought to 
enforce the above provision and requested the Court to enter 
a judgment against the defendant for all delinquent payments 
due to defendant's mother on the realty awarded to plaintiff 
which payments had accrued and were due and owing prior to 
April 19, 1976. (R. 50-53) From the foregoing, it is apparent 
that the prior Order entered by Judge Winder pursuant to the 
hearing on February 11, 1977, was not a determination of the 
issue of the delinquency of the mortgage payments or contract 
payments due on the real property awarded to the plaintiff as 
part of the debts and obligations ordered by the Court in the 
Decree of Divorce to be paid by defendant. Section 78-7-19, 
U.C.A. (1953) as cited by defendant in his brief as authority 
for the reversing of Judge Taylor's ruling has no application 
to this particular case and the situation that was before the 
lower court. Therefore, Judge Taylor properly concluded and 
ruled as a matter of law that the prior Order of Judge Winder 
was not a determination of the issue of delinquency of the 
mortgage payments or contract payments due on the real property 
awarded to plaintiff under the Decree of Divorce which had 
accrued and were due and owing prior to April 19, 1976, in that 
the issue of delinquency was never before Judge Winder and was 
-6-
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raised only for the first time in plaintiff's Verified Petition 
heard before Judge Taylor. This fact is verified by the exhibit 
which is part of the Record on Appeal, plaintiff's Exhibit #2, 
which is a letter dated July 5, 1977, from A. Dennis Norton, 
an attorney representing defendant's mother, claiming a 
delinquency or an arrearage on the real property awarded to 
plaintiff. No claim of delinquency had been made on plaintiff 
until after the ruling of Judge Winder and therefore, could not 
have been part of the request of plaintiff to modify the Decree 
of Divorce, seeking an Order requiring defendant to pay the 
future mortgage payments on the real property awarded to 
plaintiff which, in fact, was the relief sought by plaintiff 
at that time. 
A reading of the transcript of the proceedings before 
Judge Taylor sets out the basis upon which Judge Taylor 
made his ruling and that Judge Taylor recognized the ruling 
of Judge Winder. The applicable portions of the transcript 
are as follows: 
"The Court holds as a matter of law that 
Judge Winder did not rule on that." 
"The wording, the way it is, he was talking 
about an attempt to get him to pay current payments." 
"The original Decree -- I can find nothing in 
the file that has been ruled upon, and the Court 
holds as a matter of law that under the original 
Decree, the defendant was obligated to pay all 
sums due and owing as of the 19th of April, 1976, 
and that she, the plaintiff was obligated to pay 
all future payments becoming due and owing after 
the 19th day of April, 1976." (T. 105) 
-7-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Judge Hall ruled that he was to pay all of 
the marital obligations except future payment. 
Now I don't have any trouble interpreting that at 
all, and of course, I have to interpret it to 
make my ruling." (T. 110) 
"Judge Winder ruled that he was not going to 
order the defendant to pay house payments after 19 
April, 1976, this Court recognizes that ruling ****" 
(T. 116) 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the judgment and 
order of Judge Taylor is not contrary to that of Judge Winder 
and is, in fact, enforcement of the obligation of the defendant 
to pay the debts and obligations of the marriage, that included 
all contract and mortgage payments that had accrued and were 
owing on the real property awarded to plaintiff up to April 19, 
1976. The Order and Judgment of Judge Taylor was proper and 
should be affirmed. 
Ponn II 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR REFERRAL WAS NOT PROPERLY 
BEFORE THE COURT. 
Defendant's Motion for Referral was not timely filed 
and proper notice for hearing thereon was not given to the 
plaintiff. The Motion for Referral was filed with the Court 
on March 6, 1978, three (3) days before the hearing date 
requested in the Notice of Hearing attached to the Motion. 
The Motion was mailed to plaintiff's attorney on March 3, 1978. 
Rule 6(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that 
notice of hearing of motions shall be served not later than 
five (5) days before the time specified for t~e hearing unless 
a different period is fixed by the rules of the Court. Rule 6(el 
-8-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires three (3) days 
to be added to the Notice of Hearing when service is made by 
mail as was done in this case. 
The fact that defendant's Motion was not timely filed 
and proper notice was not given was sufficient grounds for the 
Court to deny the defendant's Motion for Referral and the lower 
court's decision to deny the same should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE GRANTING OF JUDGMENT BY THE LOWER COURT 
UNDER THE DECREE OF DIVORCE WAS PROPER. 
The ruling of the lower court as a matter of law that 
defendant under the Decree of Divorce was obligated to pay and 
was liable for the arrearages on the real property awarded to 
plaintiff was within the discretionary powers of the Court under 
Rule 54{c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the powers 
of the Court under its continuing jurisdiction of divorce proceedings 
to enforce and modify Decrees of Divorce. (See 30-3-5 U.C.A. 
1953) Rule 54(c) provides as follows: 
(c) Demand for Judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against 
whom a judgment is entered by default, every final 
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in 
whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the 
party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. 
It may be given for or against one or more of several 
claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the 
parties on each side as between or among themselves. 
(Emphasis added) 
A liberal construction must be given to the above cited rule 
in order to effect its purposes. (See Palombi v. D & C Builders, 
-9-
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22 U.2d 297, 452 P.2d 325, 328) The Judgment granted by 
Judge Taylor was upon an issue of law and is overwhelmingly 
supported by the evidence that was before the Court. The 
fact that a dollar amount was not determined and was left 
to be determined by other action would not invalidate the 
ruling and judgment of Judge Taylor. In the case of Potter v. 
Hussey, 1 Utah 249, the Supreme Court of Utah stated: 
"Under the former Practice Act, an order was 
a judgment upon an issue of law for a plaintiff, 
even though the amount for which plaintiff was 
entitled to judgment was not stated and had not 
been ascertained since that amount could be 
determined by reference." 
The judgment and ruling of the lower court is based upon 
the Decree of Divorce entered in this action and constitutes a 
judgment on an issue of law which is supported by the evidence 
and record before the Court and should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The claim of defendant that the Order and Judgment of the 
lower court rendered by Judge Taylor was based upon the <::laim of 
the plaintiff, already decided upon by Judge Winder in a previous 
hearing, is not supported by the evidence and the record before 
this Court. The denial of defendant's Motion for Referral was 
properly denied by Judge Taylor where the issue involved was ~ 
the enforcement of the Order and Decree of Divorce requiring 
the defendant to pay debts and obligations of the marriage up 
to April 19, 1976, and not for the purpose of seeking modification ' 
-10-
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of the Decree of Divorce, which was the issue before Judge 
Winder and ruled upon by Judge Winder. The Judgment granted 
by Judge Taylor to plaintiff based upon the Decree of Divorce 
entered in this action is a judgment on an issue of law and 
was a proper exercise of the discretionary powers of the lower 
court under the laws of the State of Utah. The Order and 
Judgment of the lower court should be affirmed and the appeal 
of defendant be dismissed with costs to be awarded to plaintiff. 
DATED this --~S(4-· ___ day of February, 1979. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
~Attorney for Respondent 
430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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